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Estate of GASTON J. BRUNET, Deceased. O. G. FREY. 
ERMUTH et at., Appellants; v. JURY SPECKTEB, 
Individually and as Administratrix, etc., et at., Re-
spondents. 
(1] WillI-LapliDg-8ubatlmUOlW'J PrcrriIiODl b:a WUl.-1D a 
devise of realty to a lWDed nonrelative "or his Estate" the 
quoted words are words, not of limit~tiOD deftniDg the estate 
the devisee wu to neeive, but of dODatioD to designate the 
recipient or recipients of the devise, and the testator's a8e 
of the disjunctive "or"denotes an intention to substitute an 
alternative taker in the event the devisee predeceased him. 
[I] Id.-Lapsfq-SubstitutioD&17 ProvisiODl iDWi4.-The word 
"another," as DIed in Prob. Code, f 92, deeIariDg that a tes-
tamentary gift to a devilee or legatee who dies during the 
testator's lifetime faDs UDless an intention appears to "sub-
stitute another" in his plaee, neeessarily implies another devi-
see or legatee eapabJe of takiDg the property. 
[8] Id.-Oonatruct1on-lDtention of Testator.-The objective in 
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain the intentioD of 
the testator u discloaed by the IaDguage he has DIed. 
[1] Dtovise or bequest to ODe "or his heirs" as aftected by death 
of pe1'80D named before death of testator, notes, 78 A.Ia.B. 992; 
128 A.L.B. 94. 
McK. Dia. &aferences: [1J Wills, 1343; [2] Wills, 1342; 
[3] Wills, 1273; [4] Wills,§325. 
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[4) Id.-Designiotion o~ -Takers-''Estate.''-The term ''Estate,'' 
as used in a will devising realty t.o a named person "or his 
Estate," and drawn by a testator who was unfamiliar with 
legal termillology. must be construed, in the light of the rule8 
that, words of a will are to receive an interpretation which 
will give them effect and avoid intestacy, to mean the devi-
see's hell'8 or devisees. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco decreeing distribution of 
an estate. T. 1. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed. 
Marion Vecki for Appellants. 
W. S. Solari and Albert Picard for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-By a holographic will dated October I, 
1941. the testator devised "To Otto Speckter or his Estate 
The Property at Clear Lake & Improvements on same." 
Speckter, who was not related to the testator, died on July 1, 
1943. The testator died on May 14, 1945. In the course 
of administration the property at Clear Lake was sold, and 
the decree of distribution awarded the proceeds of the sale 
"to the heirs or devisees of Otto Speckter, deceased, subject 
to the administration of his estate." Appellants, executors 
and legatees under the will, appeal from the decree of dis-
tribution. 
The only question presented on this appeal is whether the 
devise to "Otto Speckter or his Estate II lapsed by reason 
of Speckter's death before the death of the testator. If a 
devisee who is not kindred of the testator dies during the 
testator's lifetime, "the testamentary disposition to him fails, 
unless an intention appears to substitute another in his place . ., 
(Prob. Code, § 92.) The determination whether the devise 
lapsed therefore depends upon whether the testator intendt'd 
to substitute another for Speckter in the event he predeceased 
thec restator and, if the testator had such intention, whether 
he substituted another in Speckter's place by designating 
Speckter's "Estate" as the substitutional beneficiary. 
[1] Relying upon Estate of Sessions, 171 Cal. 346 {I5S 
P. 231], appellants contend that the phrase, "or his Estate," 
does not indicate an intention by the testator to substitute 
an alternative taker in tht' event Speckter predeceased him. 
In that case, the court held that a bequest to "William E. 
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assigns forever" lapsed on the ground that the italicized 
phrase was merely technical language customarily used to 
pass the fee to property. (Slle, also, Estate of Barton, 196 
Cal. 508, 515 [238 P. 681] ; Estate of Minor, 59 Cal.App. 616 
[211 P. 807].) In the present ea..cre, however, the' words "or 
his Estate," are words, not of limitation defining the estate 
that Otto Speckter was to receive, but of donation to desig-
nate the recipient or recipients of the devise. The testator's 
use of the disjunctive "or" clearly denotes an intention to 
substitute an alternative taker in the event Speckter prede-
ceased him. (See Estate of Coleman, 189 Cal. 612, 619 [209 
P. 571] ; Estate of Minor, supra, 59 Cal.App. 616, 619; Atkin-
son on Wills, p. 728; 4 Page on Wills [Lifetime Ed.], p. 172.) 
[2] The question remains, however, whether the testator's 
designation of Speckter's estate constitutes the substitution 
of another in the place of Speckter as required by section 92 
of the Probate Code. The word •• another" as used in that 
section necessarily implies another devisee or legatee capable 
of taking the property. Appellants contend that the estate 
of a named devisee is not another for the purpose of substi-
tution, on the ground that an estate is not a natural person 
or entity capable by law of taking under a will within the 
meaning of section 27 of the Probate Code. Respondents eon-
tend, however, that the word "Estate" was used by the tes-
tator to designate Speckter's heirs or devisees as the substi-
tutional beneficiaries and that therefore natural persons have 
been substituted in the place of Speckter to prevent the lapse 
of the devise. This contention is challenged by appellants 
on the ground that the meaning of the word" Estate" is too 
indefinite to denote the recipients of the devise. 
[3] The objective in the interpretation of 8 will is to 
ascertain the intention of the testator as disclosed by the 
language he has used. (Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337. 345 
[55 P. 1011]; Estate of Henderson, 161 Cal. 353, 357 (119 
P. 496] ; Estate of Ottoveggio, 64 Cal.App.2d 388, 391 [148 
P.2d 878].) [4] In its technical sense, the term "estate" 
signifies the "degree, quantity. nature and extent of interest i 
which 8 person has in real property." (Bouvier Law Dic-
tionnry. See, also, Civ. Code, § 761 et seq.; Rest., Property, 
§ 9.) Section 106 of the Probate Code provides that "tech-
nical 'Words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, 
unless the context cl<>arly indicates a contrary intention, or 
unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely 
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such tech-
) 
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nical sense." The will before us was drawn by the testator, 
a layman, and it is evident from the context of the devise 
that he did not use the term "Estate" in its technical sense. 
(See Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482. 491-492 t253 P. 921]; 
Estate 01 Peabody, 154 Cal. 173, 177 [97 P. 184]; Estate 01 
Coleman, ~pra, 189 Cal. 612, 620; Estate of Tkramm, 80 
Cal.App.2d 756, 762 [183 P.2d 97]; Estate of OlBen, 9 Cal. 
App.2d 374, 379 [50 P.2d 70].) When the technical meaning 
of the term is substituted for the term itself, there can be 
no doubt that the testator was not referring to the interest 
Otto Speckter was to have in the.property devised. 
The question therefore arises, what did the testator mean 
by "Estate" when he used that term in the devise! Ap-
pellants rely principally upon Estate 01 Glass, 164 Cal. 
765 [130 P. 868], to support their contention that "Estate" 
cannot be construed to mean Speckter's heirs or devisees. 
In that ease the will contained the provision, ., The balance 
to go to father Glass 'sestate. " Since Father Glass was alive 
at the time of the execution of the will, the term "estate" 
was used with reference to a living pe1'I9n. In recognition 
of this fact this court stated: '.- The language of the testa-
trix thus being referred to the date of her will and not to 
the date of her death, by the plain terms of the will Nellie 
Glass attempted to leave. the residue of her estate, not to 
Thomas Glass, but to Thomas Glass's estate. Thomas Glass's 
estate ~ not a person or entity which can take under the will. 
(Civ. Code, sees. 1275, 1313 [now, Prob. Code, §§ 27,41-43].) 
When used with refer.ence to a living man 'estate' may either 
mean all of his property and property interests, as col-
loquially, 'upon his death he will leave a large estate,' or it 
may refer specifically to a particular property in land, as his 
'estate in Sonoma County.' But however used as to a living 
man no property can pass to it by descent, devise or be-
quest." (164 Cal. at p. 767.) In the present ease, however, 
since the will provided that the property was to go to "Otto 
Speekter or his Estate," the term was used with reference 
to a deceased person. The testator's intention to provide for 
two contingencies is clear: if Otto Speekter survived the tes-
tator, the property was to go to Speckter, but if Speckter 
predeceased the testator the property was to go to Speckter's 
estate. Thus the testator's will itself provides for the very 
disposition of the property that the court in Estate 01 Glass 
said it could Dot read into the words "to father Glass's 
estate": "The construction contended for by appellants,-
) 
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namely, that the will is to be read as though it declared that 
the balance should go to Thomas Glass if alive, and if not, 
then to his estate, by his estate meaning his legal heirs, or 
his devisees or legatees as the ease may be, is too strained 
to be permissible." (164 Cal. at p. 767.) By reason of the 
use of the alternative in the will before us, "To Otto Speck. 
ler or his Estate," that construction in this case is not strained 
at all. It is the natural one. 
Moreover, such a construction is compelled by the rule 
that •• The words of a will are to receive an. interpreta· 
tion which will give to every expression some effect, rather 
than one which wil1 render any of the expressions inoperative 
... " (Prob. Code, § 102), and by the rule that "Whenever a 
disputed word or phrase may be reasonably given either of two 
meanings, that meaning should be given which will prevent 10· 
testacy . . . constructions which lead to either total or partial 
intestacy are not favored." (Estate of OZsen, supra, 9 Cal.App. 
2d 374, 379; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [108 P.2d 
893] ; Estate of Gracey, supra, 200 Cal. 482, 492; Estate of 
O'Gorman, 161 Cal. 654, 658 [120 P. 33J. See, also, Prob. 
Code, § 102.) The application of these rules to the devise 
in question leads to the conclusion that the testator meant 
that if Speckter predeceased him, the property was to go 
to the persons entitled to succeed to Speckter's estate, namely 
his heirs or devisees. This construction is not only a reason· 
abl~ and natural one, but is supported by decisions of courts 
of other jurisdictions. (Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 
Mass. 1, 5 [171 N.E. 828, 69 A.L.R. 1239]; Clark v. Payne, 
288 Ky. 819 [157 S.W.2d 63] ; Reid v Neal, 182 N.C. 192 [108 
S.E. 769J; Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J.Eq. 279, 287 
[35A.2d 475] ; Rogers v. Walton, 141 Me. 91 [39 A.2d 409] ; 
Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W.Va. 296 [73S.E. 930]; 
In re Billman's Estate, 175 Misc. 334 [24 N.Y.S.2d 43,4748]. 
Contra: Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778 [227 P. 743] 
[affirmed on rehearing, 116 Kan. 431 (227 P. 743)] ; Martin 
v. Hale, 167 Tenn. 438 (71 S.W.2d 2111; Downing v. Grigsby, 
251 Ill. 568 [96 N.E. 513]. See. also, Rest., Property, § 314, 
comment a, wherein it is stated: "Where a person makes a 
gift in remainder t.o his own heirs ... the] intends the 
same thing as if he had given the remainder 'to my estate.' " 
Accord: Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 495, 498 
[202 P.2d 1018].) 
In Reid v. Neal, supra, 182 N.C. 192, the will provided: 
"I lend to my daughter, Laura Reid, 59lf2 acres, the remainder 
) 
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of my land . . . to her during her natural life, and at her 
death 1 give it to her bodily heirs, if any, and if none to re-
turn to my estate." It was there contended that the devise 
over was void on the ground that the term "estate" did not 
refer to persons, but to the condition or circumstances in 
which the testator stood with reference to his property, and 
for the further reason that there was confusing uncertainty 
as to the persons who might succeed to the property upon 
failure of bodily heirs. In boldingthat the phrase "to return 
to my estate" should be construed to mean that the property 
was to go to the testator's heirs or next of kin upon failure 
of bodily heirs and that therefore the devise over was valid, 
the court stated: "In construing this clause-'lf any, and 
if none, to return to my estate'-the intent of the testator 
must be sought unless we hold as a matter of law that the 
clause is void upon its face. If the words referred to are 
susceptible of any construction which is consistent with the 
validity of the will in its entirety, we cannot declare them 
void .... It cannot be successfully urged that the word 
4 estate' makes the last limitation void for uncertainty. This 
word has more than one meaning, and is susceptible of more 
than one construction. Anciently confined to land, it has 
been enlarged so as to embrace property of every description. 
Enumerated with words which are descriptive of personal or 
chattel interests, it may exclude real estate altogether. It may 
denote the quantity of interest, or the thing devised, or the 
condition or circumstances in which the owner stands in 
regard to his property. [Citation omitted.) Also, it has been 
construed as meaning a person. Bennett v. 8tate [62 Ark. 
516], 36 S.W.R. 948. Its legal signification must be ascer-
tained from the context, or an examination of all the pro-
visions of the instrument in which it appears." (182 N.C. at 
198-199.) 
As in Reid v. Neal, supra, we cannot hold as a matter of 
law that the devise to Speckter'. HEstate" is void on its 
face, since the word •• estate" is sUliCeptible of more than 
one construction according to its context. It is clear from 
the context of the devise that the term "estate" was not used 
in its technical sense to describe Speckter's interest in the 
property devised, and was not used to refer to any particular 
property Speckter might have or to the aggregate of prop-
erty he might leave upon his death. It is more reasonable 
to conclude, in the light of the rulcs that the provisions of 
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tacy, that the testator, a layman, in using the term "estate" 
with reference to a deceased person and to describe the alter· 
native takers of the devise, intended that Speckter's heirs or 
devisees should take the devise in the event that Speckter 
died in the testator's lifetime. 
The decree is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 concur in the result but believe that Estate 
of Glass, 164 Cal. 765 [130 P. 868], is inconsistent therewith 
and should be overruled. The essence of the holding in that 
ease is that a devise to a named person's estate is not proper 
because the word "estate" cannot be construed to mean "heirs 
or devisees." In the case at bar the majority determines, and 
I believe properly so, that the word "estate" should and 
must be interpreted to mean" heirs or devisees." 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment solely on the 
ground that upon the record the trial court was warranted in 
finding as a fact that the testator in using the language, •• To 
Otto Speckter or his Estate," intended to make an alternative 
devise-a devise to Mr. Speckter if he survived the testator 
but in the event of his demise prior to the death of the tes-
tator, then to the heirs at law of Speckter. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting. - 1 agree with the majority 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal of the First Appel-
late District, Division Two (Estate of Brunet (Cal.App.) 
[200 P.2d 591) in holding that "an estate is not a per-
son or entity which can take under a will" as contemplated 
by the provisions of section 92 of the Probate Code and the 
decisions in this state construing that section. The majority 
opinion cannot be reconciled with the holding in the Estate 
of Glass, 164 Cal. 765 [130 P. 868]. I would therefore re-
verse the judgment. 
